think tank forum

assume no morality, let L be legitimate reward for not acting corrupt, C be secret reward for being corrupt, and P be the probability of being cause. a man chooses to make a corrupt choice if (1-P)C-L > 0.

how much of a disincentive is notoriety? let N be the value of having a good name. a man chooses to make a corrupt choice if (1-P)C+PN-L > 0.

http://www.usnews.com/polls/who-was-the-worst … sults.html

how about punishment? let the value of the punishment from justice be J. a man chooses to make a corrupt choice if (1-P)C+PN-PJ-L > 0.

could explain why some countries have such extreme methods of dealing with publicly view corruption.

the marginal benefit of a corrupt action increases as the value of having a good name increases?

i just don't understand how you're including the "disincentive of notoriety" in your model. the inclusion of justice makes sense.

i'm pretty sure you could have just referenced a becker paper.

eh right. switched the sign.

equation 1 should be :(1-P)C-PN-L > 0.

equation 2 should be :(1-P)C-PN-PJ-L > 0.

Well ignoring the attempt to quantify the subjective... I'll say this. If a government is seen as publicly supporting or ignoring corruption, then they are basically telling their people ( we don't give a crap about you ). Which means they basically fail the test of functioning as a government. That in turn will lead to a desire to see them... "replaced". Which usually means a lot of people die.

So, no one wants to be seen as not being reactive to corruption.... EVER.

i think there is a fundamental disconnect between the concept of perceived corruption and real corruption.